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NOTE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-AERIAL SURVEILLANCEADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS-Dow Chemical v.
United States, - U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1819 (1986)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States' enforcement officials from the

United States Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] made an on site
inspection of two power plants located at a 2,000 acre facility operated
by Dow Chemical Co. (Dow) in Midland, Michigan. The facility con-

sisted of several covered buildings. Manufacturing equipment and piping
conduit between the buildings were visible from the air. Following a
denial of permission for a second inspection, the EPA employed a commercial aerial photographer to photograph the Dow facility from various
altitudes using an aerial mapping camera.' The EPA did not inform Dow
that the facility was photographed. Dow, however, later found out about

the photographs. 3
Dow brought suit against the EPA in Federal District Court. Dow
alleged the EPA's aerial photography violated Dow's Fourth Amendment
right to privacy and was beyond the EPA's statutory investigative authority.4 The District Court held that: (1) the aerial photography was an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment;5 and (2) under
Section 114 of the Clean Air Act, 6 the aerial photography was not an
authorized method of inspection.'

The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court decision. 8 The court
concluded Dow had a reasonable expectation of privacy from ground
1. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
2. The camera cost over $22,000 and was described as the "finest precision aerial camera available."
Dow Chemical v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
3. Sources other than the EPA informed Dow of the EPA flyover weeks later. Id. at 1357.
4. Id. at 1356.
5. Id. at 1375. The Court had several reasons for this holding. First, the EPA's statutory investigative scheme did not have the "pervasiveness and regularity" to make it an exception to the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 1359-63. Second, Dow had an expectation of privacy because it had taken
sufficient precautions against aerial surveillance. Id. at 1363, 1366. Third, Dow's expectation was
reasonable because: (1) society has recognized the reasonableness and legitimacy of protecting
commercial privacy by enacting trade secret laws, id. at 1366-67; (2) the EPA's camera greatly
enhanced human vision, id. at 1367-69; and (3) the search did not fall under the "open fields"
exception to the Fourth Amendment. id. at 1369-72.
6. 42 U.S.C. §7414(a) (1982).
7. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1372-75.
8. 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984).
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level observation because Dow had taken sufficient precautions against
such intrusion. 9
However, the court held Dow's expectation of privacy did not extend
to aerial surveillance." The court also held the EPA had the statutory
authority to conduct the search."
The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, affirmed
the Court of Appeals.' 2 The Supreme Court agreed the aerial photography
of Dow's facility was within the EPA's statutory authority under
Section I14(a) of the Clean Air Act. The Court further held that the aerial
surveillance was not a warrantless search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 3
The Court's decision that the EPA's aerial photography of Dow's facility was not a search violating the Fourth Amendment is reviewed in
this casenote against the background case law upon which the Court relied.
To provide a more complete context for the decision, other precedents
which the majority ignored are also considered. The note analyzes the
impact of the decision on future cases where aerial surveillance of an
industrial complex is an issue. Additionally, the note discusses the implications of this decision on developing Fourth Amendment law.
BACKGROUND
The FourthAmendment and Administrative Searches
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment' 4 is to protect individual privacy
from unreasonable governmental intrusions.' 5 The Amendment accomplishes this by requiring search and seizure warrants to be issued upon a
showing of probable cause."
The scope of the Fourth Amendment protection has developed primarily
9. Dow employed such means as an 8 foot high chain-link fence around the perimeter of the
facility, guarded gates, surveillance systems, alarms, motion detectors, patrols, etc. See Dow. 536
F. Supp. at 1364-65.
10. Dow,749 F.2d at 313. The court reasoned Dow had not taken any precautions against aerial
observation, id. at 312, and the open areas of Dow's plant fell under the "open fields" exception
to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 313-314. Furthermore, the court stated the camera used by the
EPA did not cause constitutional problems because the photography did not intrude "inside the plant
offices." Id. at 314 (emphasis in original).
1I.ld. at315.
12. Dow, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
13. Id.at1824, 1827.
14. The Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.1(e) at 16 (1987).
16. Id. at §§3.1-3.7.
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in connection with police searches to obtain evidence for criminal prosecutions. 7 However, as increased regulation calls for greater use of administrative inspections, courts frequently have been asked to address
whether administrative inspections violate the Fourth Amendment."
Dow is the first case decided by the Supreme Court involving an
administrative agency's use of warrantless aerial surveillance to inspect
commercial property. Earlier, the Court decided several cases extending
Fourth Amendment protection to ground-level administrative inspections, 9
Criminal v. Administrative Searches
Initially, the Supreme Court hesitated to extend Fourth Amendment
protection beyond criminal searches and seizures. In Frankv. Maryland,20
a homeowner refused the warrantless inspection of his house by a city
health inspector looking for rodent infestation. The city fined the homeowner for his refusal. The homeowner claimed the warrantless inspection
violated his constitutional rights. The Court upheld the fine and held the
Fourth Amendment only applied to criminal searches and seizures, and
not to administrative inspections. 2 ' The Court reasoned the inspector did
not need a warrant to conduct the inspection because the inspection was
part of a regulatory scheme that benefitted the community health, was
limited to a certain time, impinged little on the individual's right to
privacy, and used a longstanding method accepted by the public. 2
Frank was overruled by Camarav. Municipal Court. 3 In Camara,the
plaintiff contested the constitutionality of a provision in the San Francisco
Housing Code which allowed warrantless inspections. The Court held
the provision violated the Fourth Amendment.24 The Court did not distinguish between rights violated by criminal searches and rights violated
by administrative inspections. "[A] search of private property without
proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant."25 The only distinction the CamaraCourt made between
17. Id. at § 1.1 at 3. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
18. See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 10.1-10.11(1987). See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlows,
436 U.S. 307 (1978) (federal inspection under Occupational Safety and Health Act); California
Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (federal inspection of business records); See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (municipal fire inspection program).
19. See infra notes 22-48 and accompanying text.
20. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).

21. Id. at 365-66.
22. Id. at 366-73,

23. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
24. Id. at 534.
25. Id. at 528-29.
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criminal searches and administrative inspections was that a lesser showing
for probable cause was needed for an administrative inspection.26
Extension of Camarato Administrative Inspections of Business Remises
Traditionally, Fourth Amendment protection was considered to extend
only to searches of homes.2" However, in See v. City of Seattle, 2s the
Court extended the reasoning of Camarato administrative inspections of
business premises. The appellant in See complained of the warrantless
inspection of a commercial warehouse. The Court held warrantless inspections of business premises as well as residential premises were unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.29 The Court reasoned, "[a]
businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right
to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his
private commercial property. 130
The Colonnade-Biswell Exception
In two cases decided after See, the Supreme Court recognized an
exception to the rule requiring a warrant to search business premises.
The exception applied to traditionally highly regulated industries where
there is strong government interest in regulating the industry.
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,3 a retail liquor dealer
refused federal agents' warrantless entry into the dealer's locked storeroom. The agents broke the lock of the storeroom in order to gain entry.
The liquor dealer claimed the search was unconstitutional. The Court
found a warrant was not necessary to inspect the liquor licensee's place
of business 32 because the liquor industry has always been closely supervised by the government. Congress has "broad power to design such
powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet
the evils at hand." 33 United States v. Biswell ' expanded the exception
further. In Biswell, a pawn shop owner contended the warrantless search
and seizure of his locked storeroom by a federal agent was unconstitu26. id. at 538-39. The Court reasoned that in health and safety inspections "le]xperience may
show the need for periodic inspections of certain facilities without a further showing of cause .
Id. at 538. Furthermore, "[tihe passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be
sufficient in a given situation to justify the issuance of a warrant." id.
27. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Amos v.United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Silverthome Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S 385 (1920).
28. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
29. Id. at546.
30. Id. at543.
31. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
32. Id. at 77.
33. id. at 76.
34. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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tional. The Court held the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because of the government's strong interest in regulating interstate traffic
in firearms. 5 The Court reasoned that a warrant requirement in gun control
inspections would impede the effectiveness of the inspection and that
inspections for
gun control were "limited threats" to a dealer's expectation
6
privacy.1
of
The Court limited the Colonnade-Biswell exception in Marshall v.
Barlow's Inc.37 In Barlow's, an electrical and plumbing installation business refused the warrantless inspection of its nonpublic premises by an
inspector empowered by Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act [OSHA]." The Court held the OSHA regulation unconstitutional as far as it authorized inspections without warrants. The Court
distinguished Colonnade and Biswell because the businesses in those cases
engaged in a closely regulated industry. The Court held the fact a business
is involved in interstate commerce is not enough to meet the ColonnadeBiswell type exception.39 The Court further held that requiring warrants
to inspect would not seriously burden the inspection system, or the courts,
and would not prevent inspections or make them less effective.'
Barlow's did not vitiate the Colonnade-Biswell exception, as demonstrated by Donovan v. Dewey." In Dewey, the Court applied the exception
to uphold the validity of warrantless inspection of mines under Section
103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act42 against Fourth Amendment challenge. The Court reasoned that the federal interest in improving
health and safety conditions in mines would best be served by warrantless
inspections. 3 In addition, the inspection program provided by the statute
was certain and regular enough to serve as "a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant."" The Court found the Act's provisions so
pervasive in the area that a mine owner would be aware he would "be
subject to effective inspection."'45 The Court also stated a long history of
35. Id. at 315.
36. Id. at 316.
37. 436 U.S, 307 (1978).
38. 29 U.S.C. §657(a) (1976).
39. 436 U.S. at 314.
40. Id. at 316, The Court proposed the use of ex parte warrants to ensure the inspection system
would not be burdened, and inspections would not be prevented or made less effective. The Court
stated the element of surprise would not be lost because if an OSHA inspector is refused entry, an
ex parte warrant would not require further notice to the establishment being inspected, The burden
on the inspection system would not be great because it would not be necessary to demonstrate
probable cause of the OSHA violation. There would only be a showing that "reasonable legislative
or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
[establishment]." Id. at 320 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 538).
41. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
42. 30 U.S.C. §813 (1976 ed. and Supp. 1l).
43. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 602-603.
44. Id. at 603,
45. Id. at 603 (quoting Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316).
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federal regulation of an industry is not required to determine the constitutionality of a warrantless search. Rather, the determining factor is the
"pervasiveness and regularity of the federal regulation.'
The Open Fields Exception to the FourthAmendment
The Supreme Court has recognized another exception to full privacy
protection under the Fourth Amendment known as the "open fields"
doctrine. This doctrine stems from Hester v. United States,47 which held
there is no Fourth Amendment protection in open areas beyond the curtilage of a home.4" In Hester, federal revenue officers observed the defendant, while defendant was outside of his house, hand a bottle of liquor
to another person. The Court held this was not an illegal search because
Fourth Amendment protection "is not extended to the open fields."'49
The Supreme Court in Air Pollution Variance Board of Colorado v.
Western Alfalfa Corp.," first applied the open fields doctrine to administrative inspections. In that case, a state health inspector entered a company's outdoor premises to test smoke emitted from the company's chimney.
The Court held the inspection fell within the open fields doctrine because
the smoke could be observed by anyone near the company's plant.
Katz-A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The "open fields" exception to the search warrant requirement accorded
with the traditional notion that a warrant safeguarded an individual from
physical intrusion into a curtilage or a dwelling.5' These were the only
places where there was a legitimate expectation of privacy. Katz v. United
States 2 held that warrants may be necessary in some cases absent a
physical intrusion, so long as a reasonable expectation of privacy was
violated. Many commentators believed Katz might have signalled the end
of the "constitutionally protected areas" concept." Katz seemed a logical
substitution for the open fields exception to the Fourth Amendment be46. id. at 606.
47. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
48. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). A curtilage is the area immediately
surrounding a home and gives the occupants of a private home a reasonable expectation of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment. See California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
49. Hester, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
50. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
51. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928) (wiretapping does not
violate the Fourth Amendment because listening, absent a physical intrusion, is not a trespass).
52. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
53. See I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4(a) at 426 (1987); Note, Aerial Surveillance:
Overlooking the FourthAmendment, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 271,275 (1981); Note, Fourth Amendment
Implications of Warrantless Aerial Surveillance, 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 309, 334 (1983): Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REv. 409, 415 (1982).
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cause of its more flexible concept of a place where there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy.
In Katz, a federal agent attached a listening device to the outside of a
telephone booth in which the petitioner made phone calls. The government
argued this method of surveillance did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because there was no actual physical intrusion of the telephone booth.
The Court disagreed and stated, "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places,""4 so its application need not depend on a physical intrusion
of an enclosure. The Court held the government's eavesdropping violated
the petitioner's privacy, which he relied upon while using the telephone
55
booth and was a "search and seizure" under the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Katz, set forth a two-part
test to determine when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.56 The
test requires "first, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.""' The Supreme Court later
adopted this test.18
Any prediction that the reasonable expectation of privacy test would
replace the open fields doctrine was premature. In Oliver v. United States,59
the Court found the Katz decision consistent with the open fields doctrine.' In Oliver, state police trespassed on the petitioner's land and
6
found a marijuana field. The Court reaffirmed Hester v. United States,
and held that open fields are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.62
The Court reasoned that "an individual may not reasonably expect privacy
out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the
home." 63 The Court read the Fourth Amendment to protect only activities
in or immediately surrounding the home. In addition, the Court found
open fields to be much more accessible to the public and police than a
home, office, or commercial structure.'
Aerial Surveillance-Lower Court Decisions
Before the decision in Oliver, lower courts used a variety of approaches
to decide aerial surveillance cases. Many courts used a Katz analysis, or
54. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
55. Id. at 353.
56. Id. at 361 (Harlan J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 9
(1968).
59. 466 U.S. 170 (1983).
60. Id. at 177.
61. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
62. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
63. Id. at 178.
64. Id. at 179.
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a variation of Katz, to determine whether warrantless aerial surveillance
violated the Fourth Amendment.6 5 The question was not whether the place

subject to investigation was an "open field." Rather, the courts struggled
to determine whether one had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
place within the meaning of Katz.'
Since the Oliver decision, the lower courts have returned to the open
fields and curtilage doctrines.6 7 The reasonable expectation of privacy is
defined, as it was before Katz, by identifying constitutionally protected
areas.
California v. Ciraolo
The companion case to Dow was Californiav. Ciraolo.6 In Ciraolo,
the Court held the aerial surveillance of the backyard of a private home
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.' 9 The Court reasoned that although
the respondent's backyard was within the curtilage of his home, the
curtilage doctrine did not bar aerial observation of the backyard.
ANALYSIS
The Court looked briefly at Dow's claim that trade secret laws, which
protect Dow from aerial photography by competitors, were relevant in
showing Dow had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court disagreed, finding state trade secret laws do "not define the limits of the
Fourth Amendment."' The Court then addressed whether the EPA's use
65. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980) (no reasonable expectation
of privacy from aerial surveillance of ranch), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); United States v.
DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial
surveillance by airplane at altitude of 50 feet over marijuana crop in open field); People v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. App.3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974) (no reasonable expectation of privacy from
aerial surveillance of stolen auto parts in backyard surrounded by fence); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal.
App.3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (unreasonable intrusion by helicopter hovering 20-25 feet
over an open marijuana field); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977) (no reasonable
expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance of an open patch of marijuana).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980) (did not mention or use the
open fields or curtilage doctrines), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); United States v. DeBacker,
493 F Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (stated there must be a reasonable expectation of privacy
even in an open field); People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974)
(did not mention or use the open fields or curtilage doctrines); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App.3d
535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (stated the open fields doctrine does not apply because of the
reasonable expectation of privacy test); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977)
(discussed but did not rely on the open fields doctrine).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (discussed curtilage
and open fields to determine whether some expectation of privacy existed in greenhouse); National
Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(activities within curtilage are protected); Wellford v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 297, 315 S.E.2d
235 (1984) (comfield was beyond curtilage in an open field).
68. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
69. Id. at 1813.
70. Id. at 1823. The Court stated "[tihe Government is seeking these photographs in order to
regulate, not to compete with Dow." Id.
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of aerial photography violated Section 114(a) of the Clean Air Act.7

Because the Court found the EPA's method of observation was "commonly available to the public at large," the Court held EPA was within
its statutory authority to conduct site inspections.72
Fourth Amendment Violation
The Court focused primarily on the Fourth Amendment question. The
issue was defined in terms of "whether the common-law 'curtilage' doctrine encompasses a large industrial complex such as Dow's." 73 Dow
argued that its industrial complex was unlike an open field, and was more
analogous to the constitutionally protected curtilage area surrounding a
home.

The Court rejected Dow's argument. The Court found that, although
the open areas in a large facility such as Dow's did not fit precisely into
the "open fields" or "curtilage" doctrines, such areas were much more
analogous to an open field.74 The Court reasoned the owner of commercial
property, unlike a homeowner, should expect to have his property inspected." Therefore, the government has "greater latitude to conduct
warrantless inspections of commercial property." 76 Moreover, anything
observable by the public is also observable to a government inspector
without a warrant.77 The court also found the EPA's view of Dow's facility
was not significantly greater than the public's view. The Court reasoned
the camera used by the EPA was not a unique sensory device that enhanced
human vision to an extent that caused constitutional problems.78
The Court's Use of Oliver
The majority followed the reasoning of Oliver by analyzing whether
Dow's facility was a constitutionally protected area, thereby avoiding
71. 42 U.S.C. §7414(a) (1982).
72. The Act requires a "presentation of... credentials" before the EPA had a right to enter any
premises. Id.at § 7414(a)(2). Dow claimed this section provided it with a right to be informed of
any inspection, and that the EPA's unannounced aerial observation deprived Dow of that right.
The Court rejected Dow's argument, and read § 114(a) to be an expansion, not a restriction, of
the EPA's powers to investigate. 106 S.Ct. at 1824. The Court reasoned that Congress is not required
to explicitly state every technique available to the EPA to monitor clean air standards, and nothing
in the Clean Air Act stated the powers provided in § 114(a) were exclusive. Id. Therefore, the Court
concluded that since aerial photography is available to the public at large, it is also available to the
EPA for monitoring without explicit authority. Id. The partial dissent agreed with this section of the
Court's analysis. Id. at 1830 n.8 (Powell J.,partially dissenting).
73. Id. at 1825.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1826.
76. Id. (quoting Donovan. 452 U.S. at 598-99).
77. Id.
78. Id. The Court suggested the use of "sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant."
ld. The Court also stated that the warrantless use of an electronic device that penetrates windows
or walls to record conversations would cause constitutional problems. Id. at 1827.
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consideration of the administrative inspection cases or Katz. Since the
requirement of a warrant arises from violations of reasonable expectations
of privacy, and Oliver held there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in an open field, the Fourth Amendment is simply inapplicable.
The Court may have misconstrued the application of Oliver. The partial
dissent argued the "open fields" doctrine is irrelevant since Dow's facility
resembles neither an "open field" nor a "curtilage," 9 and the majority
should have used the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard to
decide the case." The Court seems to have read Oliver to mean that the
"open fields"-"curtilage" distinction should be applied in all future Fourth
Amendment cases to determine whether there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy in an area. However, this interpretation of Oliver does not
take into account the holding of Katz where the Court never addressed
"open fields" or "curtilage."
Results of the Aerial Approach
Under the reasoning of Oliver, there were two approaches available
for the Court to establish whether the "open fields" or "curtilage" doctrines should have applied to Dow's complex. The Court selected an
aerial approach 8 which looks at what can be seen from the air to determine
if an area is an open field. The alternative approach looks at what can
be seen from the ground.
If it had used a ground level approach, the Court might have found
Dow had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Dow's facility could not
have been considered an open field because Dow's conduct did not allow
the facility to be viewed by the public from ground level. This type of
analysis certainly seems more fair to owners of industrial complexes
similar to Dow's. If an area is closed to the public at ground level and
not considered an open field from that viewpoint, it would also be accorded privacy from the air. 2
79. Id. at 1833 (Powell J., partially dissenting).
80. Id. at 1831-33. Justice Powell authored the majority opinion in Oliver and the partial dissent
in Dow. The dissent in Oliver and commentators such as LaFave found Oliver to be inconsistent
with many decisions, including Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). See Oliver, 466
U.S. at 185 (Marshall J., dissenting), I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4(a) at 427 (1987).
Perhaps Justice Powell was trying to reconcile these inconsistencies in his dissent.
81. 106 S. Ct. at 1826. The Court based its decision only on what was visible from the air.
82. Lower courts have never addressed whether open areas of an industrial complex are like an
open field. However, some courts have found the existence of a fence or no trespassing signs around
an area did not mean a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance was present. See,
e.g., United States v. DeBacker, 493 F Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (court noted defendant had
installed a fence and no trespassing signs around his farm but found there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy); People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112
Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974) (no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance of stolen auto
App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888
parts in backyard surrounded by fence); People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill.
(existence of a fence was noted but there was no violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1979).

Summer 1987)

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

However, application of the aerial approach used by the Court appears
more practical. If an entity takes no pains to prevent observation of its
activities from the plain view of an aircraft, there seems little reason to
afford that entity Fourth Amendment protection.
The Court's choice of the aerial approach leaves industrial complexes
unprotected from aerial surveillance by regulatory agencies. Because the
Court refused to treat Dow's industrial complex as a curtilage, Dow, and
probably all industries, must now cover sensitive areas of their facilities
which they wish to protect. Despite acknowledging it would be impractical for Dow to do this, the Court failed to offer Dow any alternatives. s3
Enhancement of Human Vision

Assuming the Court's aerial approach is correct, the question of human
vision enhancement by the EPA's camera remains." It is difficult to say

whether the majority correctly found that the accuracy of the EPA' s camera
did not enhance human vision to an extent that caused constitutional
problems. Furthermore, the Court was not very helpful in defining when
vision enhancement would be limited by the Fourth Amendment.
The Court did distinguish the use of an aerial mapping camera from
the use of satellite technology and electronic bugging devices. The Court
found that, unlike the EPA's camera, bugging devices are unique instruments that can penetrate walls of buildings and record conversations, and
satellites are a highly sophisticated technology that is not generally available to the public.8 5 However, the Court's distinction is arbitrary for two

reasons. First, although the camera used by the EPA was more generally
available for use by the public than a satellite, it was also a highly
specialized device. s6 The photographs from an orbiting satellite may not

be any more accurate than those taken from an aerial mapping camera.
Therefore, under the Court's reasoning, determination of a reasonable
83. Dow required its employees to report the descriptions and identification numbers of "suspicious" looking aircraft. Dow followed up these reports to see if any photographs were taken by the
aircraft. 106 S.Ct. at 1828 (Powell J., partially dissenting). The Court rejected the argument that
these precautions showed Dow exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance
because Dow's procedure did not actually protect the facility from aerial photography. Id. at 1826
n.4.
84. The dissent argued that the pictures taken by the camera could be greatly enlarged, accurately
revealing minute details of Dow's plant. 106 S.Ct. at 1829 (Powell J., partially dissenting). The
photographs could be enlarged "to a scale of I inch equals 20 feet or greater, without significant
loss of detail or resolution." Dow. 536 F. Supp. at 1357 (emphasis in original). If the enlargements
were viewed under magnification it was possible to see "power lines as small at '/2 inch in diameter."
Id. The Court disagreed and stated the only reason the power lines were observable was because of
their contrast with "the snow-white background." 106 S.Ct. at 1827 n. 5. The Court found "no
objects as small as t/2-inch diameter such as a class ring, for example, are recognizable, nor are
there any identifiable human faces or secret documents captured in such a fashion as to implicate
more serious privacy concerns." Id.
85. 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
86. See supra note 2.
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expectation of privacy would be based only on technology. Such a determination is arbitrary because as technology becomes more generally
available
to the public, reasonable expectations of privacy are dimin7
ished.1
Second, while appearing to differentiate surveillance by devices which
penetrate walls and windows as opposed to the EPA's use of a camera,
the Court did not adequately explain the difference between enhancement
of hearing, which requires a warrant, and the enhancement of vision,
which does not. In the context of a criminal case, the Court has recognized
that the Fourth Amendment prevents police from using an electronic
listening device, which is not unique or highly specialized, to overhear
a conversation in a public phone booth."s There seems to be no principle
by which to distinguish the case where a regulatory agency uses an
expensive, accurate camera to take photographs of the inner compound
of a private company's industrial complex. The Court seems to have
severely limited the application of Katz by giving less deference to the
privacy expectation of the owner of an industrial complex than to the
expectation of an individual.
Administrative Inspections
By relying on Oliver, the Court effectively eliminated any future analysis of the Fourth Amendment in limiting administrative inspections in
aerial surveillance cases. Since there can never be a reasonable expection
of privacy from aerial surveillance in an open area of an industrial complex, the administrative inspection decisions interpreting the Fourth
Amendment do not apply.
The Court's approach may have created too broad a result. Future cases
may arise which necessitate extension of Fourth Amendment protection
from aerial surveillance to an industrial complex. For instance, extension
may be needed in a case involving a defense contractor or other sensitive
industry. Unless overruled, the Court's analysis in Dow would prevent
the Court from ever holding a company has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the open areas of its industrial complex. Although the Court
might have reached an unwanted result in Dow by following the administrative inspection cases, 89 that type of analysis might have provided the
87. The partial dissent argued that as unique sensory devices become more generally available
to the public, the Court's distinction between the curtilage and open fields will not provide any
protection from intrusion by these devices. 106 . Ct. at 1833 (Powell J., partially dissenting). The
majority failed to address the partial dissent's argument.
88. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
89. Applying the test set out in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), the EPA probably had
a sufficient interest in ensuring Dow's facility fell under the EPA's environmental regulations, and
that interest would have best been served by warrantless inspections. However, the Court probably
would not have found the "pervasiveness and regularity" of the inspection program provided by the
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Court more flexibility in future cases. Even if an area seems analogous

to an unprotected "open field," it could still have Fourth Amendment
protection under the analysis of Dewey.
The Effect of Dow and California v.Ciroalo on the Fourth Amendment
The result in Dow is broadened even further by the holding in California
v. Ciraolo.' Together, these two cases have totally eliminated any reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance in areas that are
open to aerial view. Even fenced backyards of dwellings, areas usually
thought to be protected from warrantless observation under the curtilage
doctrine, must be covered to gain Fourth Amendment protection from
aerial surveillance.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Dow Chemical v. UnitedStates relied exclusively
on the distinction between the open fields and curtilage doctrines to make
its decision. By comparing what was observable by the EPA with what
would have been observable to the public, the Court concluded that the
open areas of Dow's chemical plant fell under the open fields doctrine.
After Dow, Fourth Amendment protection is no longer available to the
open areas of industrial complexes, such as Dow's, from aerial surveillance by regulatory agencies. Since there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy from aerial surveillance in these areas, past cases dealing with
administrative inspections of private industry, and the doctrine" established in Katz v. United States cannot be applied.
The Court in Dow has allowed the use of any kind of device for aerial
surveillance purposes as long'as the device is not unique, is generally
available to the public, and does not intrude into the windows or walls
of a building. These distinctions are highly arbitrary because as soon as
any sophisticated surveillance device becomes generally available to the
public, there would be no limits to its use.
Clean Air Act would serve as a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. See supra text
accompanying notes 41-46.
The EPA's authority to regulate the chemical industry under the Clean Air Act is probably similar
to the Department of Labor's authority under OSHA as seen in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307 (1978). See also supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. The Clean Air Act and OSHA
both authorize the regulation of a wide variety of different industries. Dow v. United States, 536 F.
Supp. 1355, 1361 (E.D. Mich. t982). In the administrative inspection cases where the Court has
found an exception to the Fourth Amendment applied, the statutory authority to regulate was limited
to one particular industry. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1980) (The Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act), 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1976 ed. and Supp. 111)); United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972) (The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §923); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (26 U.S.C. § 5146(b), 26 U.S.C. §7606).
90. 106 S.Ct. 1809 (1986).
91. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
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In Dow and California v. Ciraolo, the Court has eliminated the availability of a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance in
any area that is not covered. While this may be appropriate policy for
the surveillance of chemical plants and marijuana growers, there may be
future cases where the Court, for policy reasons, may find a reasonable
expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance should exist. The Court's
holdings in Dow and Ciraolo limit such future flexibility.
DENNIS RITSCHEL

